UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
| Terance Healy |
Third Circuit Court |
| Todd M. Krautheim |
: #13-4591 |
| on behalf of the United States |
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:District Court |
| v. |
:#13-4614 |
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| Kathleen Kane |
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| Pennsylvania Attorney General, |
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| and |
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| The Attorneys General of the United States |
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MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. This Appeal was filed where the District Court Order for Dismissal was not supported by the District Courts Memorandum and Opinion which showed “clear error” and the improper application of doctrine regarding dismissal.
2. There was no attempt to retry the matter in the Third Circuit, in good faith, Appellants were seeking to have the factual information in their documents applied to the case before the court.
3. The Court has refused to examine the errors which were the basis of the Appeal from the District Court decision.
4. The Court which clearly has NOT given the matter an independent examination of the legal issues without deference to the district court’s inexplicable and unsupported conclusions. As such, the Court has left the litigants without a court for the redress of their filed grievances which include a loss of rights and privileges protected by the United States Constitution.
5. The Court in it’s decision persists in the misinformation and improper legal conclusions.
6. Appellants recognize that the matter which they are bringing before the Court is a very serious matter of national importance as other citizens of the United States have been similarly harmed by the loss of constitutionally protected rights without recourse.
7. Appellants are not being obstinate, and have requested a true, correct and independent review of the facts of the matter and application of appropriate law and doctrine. However, the Court has demonstrated that it is determined to ignore the facts and to permit their decision to rest on the incorrect information. All requests by the Appellants to present the matter to the court or to answer the questions of the court have been denied.
8. Appellants are victims of deliberate injustice which has been inescapable in the state courts. Appellants are NOT hobbyists seeking to disturb the court for entertainment.
9. Appellants are presenting a matter of national importance with exceptional circumstance as the Court has overlooked and misapprehended points of law or fact that truly affect the outcome of the appeal.,
10. The disrespect demonstrated to the litigants by the District Court and the Third Circuit Court are inexcusable. As evidenced in the misinformation of the Court’s documents and unexplained decisions, the integrity of the court has been sacrificed in the effort to suppress the matter from resolution.
11. Where the Court may be prohibited by law from explaining the circumstance or indicating what required the improper and unsupported actions. Appellants hereby present the following information to demonstrate that it was not their intention to further sacrifice the integrity of the court.
RULE 1.6 AFFECTS THE REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE 1.6
12. The action which occurred and required the sacrifice of the district court’s integrity and escalated to adversely affect the integrity of the Third Circuit judiciary occurred on September 6, 2013.
13. A default situation by each of the Attorneys General would have permitted the court to rule that the challenged law was UNCONSTITUTIONAL without necessarily being involved in the finding of that decision. The Court could lawfully take that action without responsibility for the revelation of the impact of Rule 1.6 on the integrity of the judiciary.
14. After the default answer date had passed for the Pennsylvania Attorney General, Randall Henzes filed a late Motion without excuse or explanation purportedly on behalf of Pennsylvania Attorney General Kathleen Kane.
15. The September 6, 2013 filing served as a ‘monkeywrench’ in the entire matter as Attorney General Kathleen Kane is required to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct – Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information.
16. Rule 1.6 prevents the Attorney General from revealing information regarding her clients. Personnel in the Office of the Attorney General are clients of the Attorney General. Attorney General Kane would be prohibited from revealing the independent action of Randall Henzes.
17. This action further would require a direct decision of the court which would sacrifice the integrity of the judge when a ruling on the matter could not be substantiated.
“Plaintiffs seek to restore the constitutional rights of Pro Se litigants while restoring the integrity and reputation of the judiciary and the legal profession and deliver to the legislature the ability to perform the duties of their position to responsibly manage the law.”
– Constitutional Challenge filed August 8, 2013
CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURT
18. Efforts to prevent exposure of the manipulation of the docket by the clerk of courts failed as the litigants noticed the removal of the attorneys general from the matter on the docket; the failure to certify the constitutional challenge of a statute with each state; the failure to notify the United States Attorney General for intervention; the incorrect entry of documents on the docket; etc….
19. Additionally, a number of people indicated that the case was not available when searching within the PACER system, while the court had neglected to grant permission for the litigants to have access through the Pacer system. Permission for access to the electronic filing system was requested three times before the court granted permission with no explanation for the three month delay.
20. The case was prematurely closed on the district court docket.
21. The matter had to be re-opened to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently dismissed by the court based on an improperly applied rule.
22. Only after filing of the Notice of Appeal did the clerk of courts serve the United States Attorney General with the Summons and Challenge documents through the US Attorneys Office in Philadelphia.
23. When the Appeal moved to the Third Circuit, there was no attempt to contact the fifty six attorneys general where the case manager had indicated the attorneys general would be contacted at least twice to ascertain their participation in the appeal.
24. Letters from the Attorney General of New Jersey and the Attorney General of Alaska indicated that they had been advised by the clerk of court to not participate in the Appeal and to pass that instruction along to the other attorneys general. Calls to Alaska were not returned. Calls and visits to the New Jersey Attorney General and the Third Circuit Clerk were ignored.
FAILURE TO ADDRESS ISSUES ON APPEAL
25. When the Third Circuit returned their decision which failed to address the issues raised in the Appeal, the memorandum misrepresented “other” issues without basis in facts of the case. The unsigned Per Curiam order sacrificed the integrity of the Third Circuit court.
26. Upon submission of a Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc, Appellants expected and deserved a responsive review of the issues which were raised in support of the Hearing/Rehearing En Banc.
27. The Third Circuit delivered a deliberately deceptive explanation which through semantics avoids accountability to the individual judges of the Third Circuit and fails to actually indicate if ANY judge participated in the decision.
28. There has been no indication that any judge of the Third Circuit requested disqualification from the matter.
IMPARTIAL AND INDEPENDENT REVIEW
29. The inability of the federal courts to provide factual and valid statements in ANY decision rendered in the matter demonstrates that the independence of the judiciary is being affected by an influence which the judiciary does not explain.
30. The United States Constitution protects a litigant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial judge.
31. The Due Process Clause was intended to ensure that no person would be deprived of life, liberty, or property at the hands of the government without a fair opportunity to contest the validity of the deprivation. Certainly, this also applies to deprivation of constitutional rights and privileges.
32. Although dependent somewhat on the precise nature of the interest at stake, the fairness demanded by due process usually includes notice and the opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-maker.
33. These simple procedural protections were designed to “minimize the risk of erroneous decisions” and to help achieve the “ultimate goal of all procedural due process rules”—an accurate judgment.
34. A biased judge presents the greatest threat to the promise of due process because a judge’s conscious or unconscious partiality will infect the process and outcome of a trial.
35. To protect against that threat, due process bars a judge from presiding over a matter in which an actual judicial bias or prejudice can be demonstrated.
36. The Due Process Clause requires removal of a judge not only upon a showing of actual bias, but any time the circumstances create a strong probability of bias on the part of the average judge.
37. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, the Court reiterated this principle, stating that due process requires disqualification under circumstances “in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”
38. The probability of bias will exceed constitutional limits whenever under an objective and “realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weaknesses” there is “a serious risk of actual bias.”
39. Thus, in the context of judicial disqualification, the purpose of the Due Process Clause is simply to protect the accuracy of the fact-finding process by prohibiting a judge who is actually or most probably biased from derailing the truth-finding process. Due process is concerned with the reality of justice—not the appearance of justice.
40. It may be that by ensuring an impartial judge in fact, the Due Process Clause fosters the appearance of impartiality and thereby builds public confidence in the judiciary. But the Clause was not designed, intended, or implemented to protect appearances.
41. And the Court “has never rested the vaunted principle of due process on something as subjective and transitory as appearance.”
42. Protecting appearances lies strictly within the providence of nonconstitutionally based disqualification rules adopted by federal and state legislatures and courts.
43. Due process protects the rights of litigants and is an essential component of the disqualification equation. Disqualification is intended to protect appearances while building public trust in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
44. Respectfully, Appellants request to know if any or all members of the judiciary requested disqualification from this matter.
45. And, of those judges not requesting disqualification, Appellants request the decisions of the individual judges regarding hearing/rehearing.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE RAISES ITSELF WITHIN THE MATTER
46. A ruling in favor of the Appellants would go on to indicate the direct involvement and participation of the state and federal judiciary in the conspiracy to deny constitutional rights collaterally caused by Rule 1.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct which has been enacted into law in every state without constitutional review.
47. Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires a judge to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
48. Whereas, officials and even judges have no immunity (See, Owen vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials ansd judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C Sec 1983.
49. “Personal involvement in deprivation of constitutional rights is prerequisite to award of damages, but defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.” Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988)
50. “A prejudiced, biased judge who tries a case deprives a party adversely affected of due process.” See Nelson v. Cox, 66 N.M. 397.
51. The right to a tribunal free from bias and prejudice is based on the Due Process Clause. Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his/her property, then the judge has engaged in the crime of interference with interstate commerce; the judge has acted in his/her personal capacity and not in the judge’s judicial capacity. See U.S. v. Scinto, 521 F.2d 842 at page 845, 7th circuit, 1996.
52. In Edwards v. Wiley, 374 P.2d 284, the court ruled and determined that, “Judicial officers are not liable for erroneous exercise of judicial powers vested in them, but they are not immune from liability when they act wholly in excess of jurisdiction.” See also, Vickery v. Dunnivan, 279 P.2d 853, (1955).
53. In Beall v. Reidy, 457 P.2d 376, the court ruled and determined, “Except by consent of all parties a judge is disqualified to sit in trial of a case if he comes within any of the grounds of disqualification named in the Constitution. In Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 7th Cir. (1989), the circuit ruled, “Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify, even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification.” Also, when a lower court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment, the question of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. See DeBaca v. Wilcox, 68 P. 922.
54. In Sparks v. Duval County Ranch, 604 F.2d 976 (1979), the court ruled and determined that, “No immunity exists for co-conspirators of judge. There is no derivative immunity for extra-judicial actions of fraud, deceit and collusion.”
55. “A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction.” Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937.
56. “Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris.” Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.
RECONSIDERATION
57. Before the Court of Appeals concludes its proceedings, Appellants request the court Reconsider the Petition for Hearing or Rehearing En Banc.
MOTION TO STRIKE A DEFECTIVE AND VOID ORDER
58. Further demonstrating the necessity which necessitated and lead to the Constitutional Challenge, the Appellants request the Court review the MOTION TO STRIKE A DEFECTIVE AND VOID ORDER pursuant to Rule 60(b) Relief From A Judgment or Order.
59. The Pennsylvania Courts have ignored the testimony and evidence on the court record while neglecting to address the defective and void order issued without proper jurisdiction.
60. This is NOT a request to review a decision of the Pennsylvania Courts. The Pennsylvania Courts have failed to take the lawful action to address their lack of jurisdiction to issue the order presented in the motion.
61. The deliberate issuance of a defective and void order has caused a denial of property, life, liberty, due process, equal protection under the law, and threatens to result in incarceration where a judge of the Court of Common Pleas has ignored the lack of jurisdiction and has based his subsequent order on the defective order which requires the payment of over $300,000 penalty for contempt where there was no contempt. Penalties for contempt can result in incarceration until the payment is complete.
62. Three pending Appeals to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania which have been delayed, stalled or obstructed are based on the defective and void order.
63. It is the constant threat of further harassment and terror based on this deliberately defective and void order which has resulted in the necessity of the Constitutional Challenge of Rule 1.6.
64. The resulting unresolvable loss of constitutional rights occurs within the state court and results in the inability for the court to lawfully address the treasonous act of the judge acting without jurisdiction.
65. The ability for any litigant to present the defective and void order in any interaction with the court to further attack to the property, life and liberty of the Appellant leverages the ‘rules of the court’ and results in the further harassment of the litigant by injustice.
66. A deliberately defective and void order which lacks jurisdiction causes the denial of constitutionally protected rights and prevents resolution of any matter in accordance with the law and denies justice.
67. It is only after the matter is raised for appeal where laws and procedures are not followed or properly applied without any available recourse to enforce the laws and procedures of the state and the court that the evidence proves the loss of constitutional rights without any recourse.
68. The MOTION TO STRIKE A DEFECTIVE AND VOID ORDER filed concurrently with this Petition for Reconsideration requests the lawful action by the court in accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Rules of Federal Procedure.
69. The detailed information in the motion demonstrates a single segment of the injustice which has affected the matter within the state court. A
HISTORY OF THE MATTER OF HEALY v. HEALY
70. Dating back to August 2007, an ex parte order which was issued without any proceeding by Judge Rhonda Daniele, never docketed or distributed to Terance Healy, and utilized to undermine every proceeding for 3 years while concealed by the Montgomery County Judiciary and the opposing party.
71. That document was fraudulently presented as a valid document to make false allegations, to deprive custody, to burglarize the residence, to slander and liable, and as leverage against every petition filed with the court.
72. Once discovered by Terance Healy and docketed in August 2010, all remaining proceedings and actions demonstrate the deliberate attempts by the court to deny and prevent testimony at any future hearings.
73. Every good faith effort to address the injustice which resulted from the ‘secret’ void order was ignored by the court.
74. In haste and chaos, after the repeated cancellation and repeated rescheduling of remaining petitions before the court, Judge Carolyn Carluccio, the fifteenth judge to have been assigned the matter, deliberately issued a defective and void order without regard for lawfully mandated procedure which provides proper jurisdiction for the court to act.
75. The Order was referred to as “an unappealable order,” however, the court failed to anticipate that the failure to follow lawful procedure caused a lack of jurisdiction making the order both defective and void and the order could be challenged directly or collaterally at any time.
76. The deliberately defective and void order has corrupted every department within the Montgomery County Courthouse, from the Prothonotary to the Domestic Relations Office in efforts to deny justice and conceal the malicious actions of the court.
77. The actions of the Montgomery County Judiciary in direct violation of the law and the denial of the rights of the litigant much of which appears on the court record grew to involve every level of law enforcement who refused to become involved because of a false lack of ‘jurisdiction’.
78. Law enforcement had the proper jurisdiction to act, however Rule 1.6 of the Rule of Professional Conduct prevented the lawful ability to proceed where prosecution would adversely affect the integrity of the judiciary, the reputation of lawyers and possibly self-incriminate.
AFFECT ON JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
79. Whereas, officials and even judges have no immunity (See, Owen vs. City of Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; officials and judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials ansd judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured by the Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C Sec 1983.
80. “Personal involvement in deprivation of constitutional rights is prerequisite to award of damages, but defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.” Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988)
81. “A prejudiced, biased judge who tries a case deprives a party adversely affected of due process.” See Nelson v. Cox, 66 N.M. 397.
82. The right to a tribunal free from bias and prejudice is based on the Due Process Clause. Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his/her property, then the judge has engaged in the crime of interference with interstate commerce; the judge has acted in his/her personal capacity and not in the judge’s judicial capacity. See U.S. v. Scinto, 521 F.2d 842 at page 845, 7th circuit, 1996.
83. In Edwards v. Wiley, 374 P.2d 284, the court ruled and determined that, “Judicial officers are not liable for erroneous exercise of judicial powers vested in them, but they are not immune from liability when they act wholly in excess of jurisdiction.” See also, Vickery v. Dunnivan, 279 P.2d 853, (1955).
84. In Beall v. Reidy, 457 P.2d 376, the court ruled and determined, “Except by consent of all parties a judge is disqualified to sit in trial of a case if he comes within any of the grounds of disqualification named in the Constitution. In Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 7th Cir. (1989), the circuit ruled, “Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify, even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification.” Also, when a lower court has no jurisdiction to enter judgment, the question of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. See DeBaca v. Wilcox, 68 P. 922.
85. In Sparks v. Duval County Ranch, 604 F.2d 976 (1979), the court ruled and determined that, “No immunity exists for co-conspirators of judge. There is no derivative immunity for extra-judicial actions of fraud, deceit and collusion.”
86. “A departure by a court from those recognized and established requirements of law, however close apparent adherence to mere form in method of procedure, which has the effect of depriving one of a constitutional right, is an excess of jurisdiction.” Wuest v. Wuest, 127 P2d 934, 937.
87. “Where a court failed to observe safeguards, it amounts to denial of due process of law, court is deprived of juris.” Merritt v. Hunter, C.A. Kansas 170 F2d 739.
STAY OF THE MANDATE WHILE UNDER REVIEW
88. Before this Court issues it’s MANDATE, Appellants request the court recognize thescope of the unconstitutionality of laws which direct the court to deny constitutional rights, prevent an impartial and independent review of the matter and require the conspiracy of the judiciary to deny justice in this matter.
89. Appellants request that this court recognize the misrepresentation of the facts and information provided to the court in this matter which fail to substantiate the courts decisions.
90. Appellants have filed the Constitutional Challenge on behalf of the United States and served it upon every state attorney general to lawfully address the same denial of constitutional rights, and obstruction of justice made lawful while unconstitutional which affects the People of the United States.
91. It was not the intention of the Appellants to cause the failure of the integrity of this honorable court in an attempt to have justice. Appellants beg the court recognize that it is the ‘rules of the court’ which cause the lapse in integrity which the Appellants repeatedly present to the attention of the court.
92. The Court has a responsibility to the law and to justice to recognize that it’s actions in accordance with the rules of the court are preventing the resolution of the matter.
93. Further, as those rules deny and prevent the constitutional rights of the litigant and are adversely affecting the integrity of the judiciary and the court, the court has the authority to recognize the unconstitutional impact of those rules upon the litigant and the responsibility to take the actions in this matter which best serve justice under the United States Constitution.
94. The Appellants request that justice be served within the authority of the United States Constitution.
CERTIORI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
REFERRAL TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
WHERE the “rules of the court’ result in the unconstitutional obstruction and denial of the constitutional rights of the People; and
WHERE the court has demonstrated the inability to explain, to responsibly address and to recognize the violation of the public trust by the Judicial branch,
APPELLANTS REQUEST the court refer the matter to the United States Congress for resolution through Constitutional Amendment and thus act lawfully to restore the constitutional rights of the People of the United States which have been negated and lost within each state as the state supreme courts enacted the Rules of Professional Conduct (Specifically, Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information) into law without consideration of the collateral impact upon the constitutional rights and privileges of the People guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Injustice does not end injustice. It extends it.
Respectfully,
Terance Healy
Todd M. Krautheim
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Governor Tom Corbett
Newt Gingrich
Representative Kate Harper
Representative Todd Stephens
Representative Kathy Watson
Senator Robert Casey, Jr.
