A Terroristic Divorce

(PDF Version)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. Plaintiffs have filed this Constitutional Challenge on behalf of themselves and in the name of the United States and properly served it upon Attorneys General of the United States challenging the constitutionality of Rule 1.6 – Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

2. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Rule 1.6 Confidentiality of Information of the Rules of Professional Conduct as the rule causes the complete denial of constitutionally protected rights while subverting justice and corrupting the judiciary. (Initial Pleading August 8, 2013, #5 Statement of Claim)

LAWFUL ACTION

3. Plaintiffs are subject to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States of America.

4. The Attorneys General are subject to the laws of their respective states and the United States of America. The Attorneys General, as attorneys, are required to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct.

5. Plaintiffs have stated that they are NOT BOUND by the Rules of Professional Conduct and, as such, are lawfully permitted to take this action to address the unlawfully enacted, improperly constructed, unjust and unconstitutional law.

6. Pursuant to Rule 1.6, the Attorneys General cannot lawfully take any action to address the constitutionality, the lack of enforcement, and the judicial corruption which mandates a loss of judicial integrity. Paradoxically, the continued injustice for the victims denied their rights and liberties is an indirect result of Rule 1.6.

7. The fifty six (56) Attorneys General of the United States, have yet to file a responsive pleading to the August 8, 2013 Challenge with any defenses, admissions or denials of the allegations or the substance of the constitutional issue.

RESPONSIBILITY

8. The Attorneys General have a responsibility and jurisdiction to address the constitutionality of laws in their respective states, as such Plaintiffs have served the Attorney General with the Constitutional Challenge pursuant to Rule 5.1(a)(2).

9. Attorney General Kane’s Motion to Dismiss is approaching this challenge as a §1983 complaint and citing case law which does not apply to a Constitutional Challenge, or to the Plaintiffs who have taken on the role usually presented by an Attorney General.

10. There is no case law, precedent or citations available which addresses the lawful, but unconstitutional, overthrow of every state government where the Judiciary usurps the power of the Governor and the Legislature and prevents prosecution for sedition and treason against the person(s) or organization involved..

“America will never be destroyed from the outside. If we falter and lose our freedoms, it will be because we destroyed ourselves.” – Abraham Lincoln ¹

11. Article III of the Constitution grants the Judicial Branch authority to adjudicate cases and controversies. Plaintiffs have presented their case, controversies and injuries in their initial pleading, and specifically in paragraphs #5, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 75. The Plaintiffs’ have a direct stake in the matters which are redressable by this Federal Court.

12. The Constitutional Challenge (#13-4614) filed on August 8, 2013 is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety, and specifically for the paragraphs above mentioned.

13. Attorney General Kane’s statement regarding the constitutionality of the law having no effect on the plaintiffs is a gross misstatement. Rule 1.6 mandates those who are bound by the rule to conceal injustice; ignore corruption; dismiss crime; endorse judicial misconduct; and deny any lawful ability or jurisdiction to enforce the law. These types of neglectful actions have had an effect on the Plaintiffs, and the entire country.

14. Attorney General Kane has publicly stated that
“The Attorney General has a multitude of duties. The first is to protect and defend and obey the Constitution of the United States and of Pennsylvania. The oath that I took on January 15 said exactly that.”

“As a lawyer, I am a lawyer first. I must follow the Rules of Professional Conduct.”
– Face the State, Sunday August 18, 2013 ²

15. As a lawyer, who must follow the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6 has overruled the Law, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Constitution of the United States, while preventing the Attorney General – the top law enforcement officer in the state – from lawful action.

16. Rule 1.6 has additionally enabled County District Attorneys to usurp law enforcement power from the County Sheriff – the highest law enforcement officer in the county.

17. Where all law enforcement activity (investigation and prosecution) must be authorized by the County District Attorney or the Attorney General – both of whom MUST be attorneys who MUST follow the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6 effectively denies victims of any course of action to address judicial misconduct, judicial corruption, or any criminal action which will expose judicial misconduct or corruption, or criminal activities which are endorsed by a member of the judiciary.

PLAINTIFFS CLAIM AND STANDING FOR RELIEF

18. The settled rule in the Third Circuit, as in all Federal Courts, is that “dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only if it is beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” To make this determination the court must “accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.”

19. Statements in documents filed in this Court by Attorney General Kane support and confirm the validity and truth of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding (1) the failure to enforce the law ³, (2) the responsibility for the law ³ and (3) the ignorance of the damages caused as a result of the law ³.

20. Attorney General Kathleen Kane has ignored and denied the Plaintiffs any opportunity to present their case and their loss of rights and liberties. This has also been the case with predecessors Linda Kelly and Tom Corbett.

21. The Attorney General has lawfully (pursuant to Rule 1.6) denied the Plaintiffs any remedy to their continued denial of constitutionally protected rights and liberties.

22. The allegations in the Challenge indicate denial of access to the courts for redress of grievances. Plaintiffs will clearly demonstrate the denial to have their cases heard by an unbiased tribunal; with notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it; with opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken; the right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses; the right to know opposing evidence; the right to cross examine adverse witnesses; a decision based on the evidence presented; the requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of evidence presented; the requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons for its decision.

23. Plaintiffs are requesting the constitutional determination of this court and requesting such preventive relief for a permanent resolution which is necessary to restore their constitutionally protected rights and liberties as citizens of the United States.

24. Standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute is accurate where the statute would otherwise deprive a party of a right or a privilege even where the statute itself does not apply to them.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES

25. Attorney General Kane has correctly indicated that Rule 1.6 was enacted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania without benefit of statutory review and construction by the Legislature or proper signature of the Governor.

26. Pennsylvania Chapter 19 Sub B §1925 – Constitutional Construction of Statutes
“The provisions of every statute shall be severable. If any provision of any statute or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the statute, and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby, unless the court finds that the void provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so depend upon, the void provision or application, that it cannot be presumed the General Assembly would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent.”

27. Rule 1.6 is severable without affecting the remaining provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

28. Rule 1.6 was not enacted with benefit of the General Assembly and, as such, it cannot be assumed nor ascertained to be an essential part of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

29. Rule 1.6 was not enacted by the General Assembly and, as such, without benefit of the legislative intent controls §1921(a), (b), (c) and the presumptions in ascertaining legislative intent §1922.

30. The Attorney General’s reference to Article V, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not authorize the Supreme Court the ability to construct and enact laws which usurp enforcement power and mandate confidentiality to conceal and prevent prosecution of criminal actions by legal professionals.

ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES

31. Plaintiffs will present circumstances where the Attorneys General have demonstrated their inability to take action which exposes judicial misconduct, not only for the named plaintiffs, but also for those on whose behalf the plaintiffs have filed – where a large portion of the citizenry have been placed at risk and the Attorneys General have ‘lawfully’ failed to take action to investigate or prosecute.

32. Plaintiffs additionally offer the extreme examples of crimes committed against the citizens of Pennsylvania and the United States which involve actions relating to attorney or judicial misconduct including Cash for Kids (Luzerne County, PA), Foreclosure Crisis (Nationwide), Penn State University Scandal (State College, PA).

33. In each additional example, the crimes were permitted to continue where any investigation/prosecution would have resulted in the exposure of crimes and misconduct where Rule 1.6 mandated confidentiality of information and prevented lawful action by a District Attorney, an Attorney General or any officer of the court.

34. Attorney General Kane will need to further explain how the declaration of a law being UNCONSTITUTIONAL has no effect, or will have no effect on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as stated in her Motion to Dismiss (B).

35. Plaintiffs have not filed this as a personal claim against Attorney General Kathleen Kane seeking damages.

36. Attorney General Kane has been served with the Challenge as the Attorney General is the appropriate person with whom the issue of constitutionality of a state law must be addressed within the state pursuant to Rule 5.1(a)(2), as the other Attorneys General are similarly positioned within their state governments and have been similarly served with the challenge.

37. Plaintiffs have filed a Constitutional Challenge with The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and served it upon the Attorneys General of each state seeking a determination that Rule 1.6 is unconstitutional which will restore the constitutional rights of litigants while restoring the integrity and reputation of the judiciary and the legal profession and delivering to the legislature the ability to perform the duties of their position to responsibly manage the law.

STANDARDS FOR DEFENSES BY MOTION

38. The standard for subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) has been presented and met by the Plaintiffs.

39. When deciding a 12(b)(1) motion, “dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only because the right claimed is ‘so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of the Supreme Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.’” Kulick v. Pocono Downs Racing Association 816 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666, 94 S. Ct 772, 776, (1974)).

40. The ‘irreducable constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Id. Internal citations omitted). A particularized injury in one which affects the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. Id. At n.1. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the issue complained of. (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 41). Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).

41. The standard for personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) has been presented and met by the Plaintiffs.

42. The standard for venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) is properly placed in The United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for a civil action:
– where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred;
– where plaintiffs are residents of the judicial district;
– where defendant is an officer of the state acting in official capacity or under color of legal authority.

43. The standard for process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(4) having been commenced on August 8, 2013 with the filing of the Challenge with the District Court; and the US Clerks docketing and issuance of the Summons and Notice.

44. The standard for service of process pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) having been accomplished by the direct service of the initial pleading, summons and notice to each Attorney General via United States Postal Service Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested on August 13, 2013. A Certificate of Service including signed receipts from each Attorney General was filed with the District Court Clerk on September 6, 2013.

45. The standard for stating a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) has been presented and met by the Plaintiffs.

46. When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a dismissal may only be granted where the allegations fail to state any claim upon which relief can be granted. See Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court must view all facts, and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990). However, the Court will construe a pro se Plaintiff’s complaint more liberally and hold it to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292 (10976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S. Ct. 594, 5965 (1972).

47. The general rules of pleading still require only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, not detailed factual allegations. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231.

48. The Court must “determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Pinkerton v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir 2002).

49. Pro se plaintiffs are often unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court has instructed the district courts to construe pro se complaints liberally and to apply a more flexible standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint than they would in reviewing a pleading submitted by counsel.” (See e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 175-76, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.)

CONCLUSION

50. Plaintiffs represent that while affected by Rule 1.6, they are NOT bound by Rule 1.6 and as such Plaintiffs are in the unique position to be acting lawfully with proper standing while having valid cause for relief in the proper forum for the matter to be addressed.

51. Plaintiffs request that Attorney General Kane’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) be DENIED with prejudice.

52. In the interest of continuing with the stated goal of a “just, speedy and inexpensive determination“ of this action, Plaintiffs request that the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED with prejudice so that the court will not be inundated with 55 further motions for dismissal raising these same standard procedural defenses by the Attorneys General, however DENIED without prejudice to raise the issue in their responsive pleadings to the challenge.

Respectfully,

The plaintiffs ask the Attorneys General to respond within 30 days to these requests by admitting, for purposes of this action only and subject to objections to admissibility at trial:

1. The genuineness of the following documents, copies of which are attached.

a) Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Norristown, PA Docket# 2007-12477
b) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA Docket# 1330 EDA 2013
c) The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, PA Docket# 155 MM 2013
d) Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Norristown PA Docket# 2013-29976
e) Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, Doylestown, PA Docket# 2011-00193
f) Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, Doylestown, PA Docket# 2012-05546
g) Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, Doylestown, PA Docket# 2013-07214

EXHIBIT A
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas
Norristown, PA
Docket# 2007-12477

EXHIBIT B
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA
Docket# 1330 EDA 2013

EXHIBIT C
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Harrisburg, PA
Docket# 155 MM 2013

EXHIBIT D
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas
Norristown PA
Docket# 2013-29976

EXHIBIT E
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas
Doylestown, PA
Docket# 2011-00193

EXHIBIT F
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas
Doylestown, PA
Docket# 2012-05546

EXHIBIT G
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas
Doylestown, PA
Docket# 2013-07214

1. Plaintiffs request that Attorney General Kane’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) be DENIED with prejudice.

2. In the interest of continuing with the stated goal of a “just, speedy and inexpensive determination“ of this action, Plaintiffs request that the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED with prejudice so that the court will not be inundated with 55 further motions for dismissal raising these same standard procedural defenses by the Attorneys General, however DENIED without prejudice to raise the issue in their responsive pleadings to the challenge.

3. In support of this request, Plaintiffs present the attached Memorandum of Law.

NOT LAWFULLY ENACTED

4. Attorney General Kane has additionally indicated in her filings with the Court on this matter that the law being challenged was enacted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and not enacted through the legislature, nor signed by a governor.

5. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania through Rule 1.6 has given itself power over lawyers – which include the Governor, the Attorney General and a majority of the legislature – without due process.

6. All power to lawfully address the improperly enacted law has been removed from those responsible for lawmaking, the legislature and the Governor, and usurped by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This is a clear violation of separation of powers.

7. Attorney General Kane has indicated a lack of jurisdiction, and having no ability to enforce the law being challenged. The power of enforcement unlawfully rests exclusively with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

8. Rule 1.6 is authored, updated, edited, promoted, maintained, managed, directed and scripted by the American Bar Association. It is reasonable to question if the American Bar Association has effectively usurped the government of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and each state where Rule 1.6 has been enacted.

9. Rule 1.6 denies litigants of the constitutionally protected right to petition the government for redress of grievances, denies a litigant of life, liberty and/or property without due process of law, and usurps the power of the government to address the issue by placing all power in one branch of government – the judiciary.

10. Rule 1.6 is unlawful and unconstitutional in every location where it has been enacted. Lawful action to challenge the law can only be done by those who are not required to follow it:
“Pro Se litigants with proper standing and a cause for relief – the restoration of rights and liberties protected by the U.S. Constitution.”

On behalf of the United States of America, Plaintiffs affirm their proper lawful standing to challenge the constitutionality of this improperly enacted law in every State, the District of Columbia and the US Virgin Islands.

Where Rule 1.6 has not been enacted into law, Attorneys General are on notice of this Constitutional Challenge and the impact the Rule can have on the civil rights and liberties of the People.

Respectfully,

Chief James Miller,

I have just been advised that my mother was visited by a patrol car at her home today at 871 Mustang Road.

My mother is an 80 year old woman living alone with health issues. While unintentional, the visit from your officer frightened her. the officer asked about my whereabouts, what car i drove, and how often I driove her car. I am sure you can understand her fright.

Your officer was relaying a message from a Montgomery Township Police Officer after she received repeated calls from him today. I have responded to officer Ruchkin by fax. I include that fax for your reference.

I would like to know what allegations were made that caused Warrington Police to pay a courtesy call to learn my whereabouts and what car I drove. This is a genuine request for information.

The matter in Montgomery Township is a civil matter being litigates in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. I am seeking to assert my lawful and legal ownership of property illegally and fraudulently conveyed to the Millers – a lawyer and real estate agent. Judge Coonahan has been notified of the threat against me made by Montgomery Township Police via a court filing this evening.

Thank You,

Terance Healy

Cheif Scott Bendig,
Officer John Rushin,

regarding the repeated calls to my mother’s home today, please stop that.

Attached are copies of documents relating to the civil litigation regarding the fraudulent conveyance of my property and residence at 110 Banbury Avenue, North Wales, PA 19454

Copies of:
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas Docket #2013-29976 (1 page)
Complaint in Ejectment (29 pages)
Emergency Praecipe for immediate Eviction/Order of Possession (1 page)
Emergency Praecipe for immediate Eviction/Order of Possession (Addendum) (1 page)

Please accept these documents as a Criminal Tresspass Complaint against David & Jennifer Miller in this regard. If this format is not acceptable for a foprmal complaint, please forward the proper complaint forms to the address below.

While it was not my intention to file a criminal complaint at this time, the threat to my liberty mandates a response.

Terance Healy

“At what point then is the approach of danger to be expected? I answer, if it ever reach us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.” – Abraham Lincoln

(from “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions: Address Before the Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois” January 27, 1838)

“America will never be destroyed from the outside. If we falter and lose our freedoms, it will be because we destroyed ourselves.” – Abraham Lincoln

 
Lincoln had incredible vision.

 
 

( PDF )

1. After service of the EMERGENCY PRAECIPE file with this Court on October 15, 2013, Plaintiff’s 80-year old mother was contacted by telephone multiple times by the Montgomery Township Police Department.

2. Montgomery Township Police Office Ruchkin has threatened the plaintiff with arrest if he approached his own property at 110 Banbury Avenue North Wales, PA 19454.

3. Plaintiff has taken no aggressive or violent action against the Defendants and as such, the threats to his freedom from Montgomery Township are unwarranted, unnecessary and unlawful.

4. Defendants have misrepresented ownership to Montgomery Township Police and have manipulated them into actions which are clearly an abuse of power under color of law.

5. As the Plaintiff is unaware of any allegation of criminal charges, the Montgomery Townnship Police have no jurisdiction in this civil matter.

6. THREATS TO THE SAFETY AND LIBERTY OF THE PLAINTIFF WARRANT THI COURTS IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

WHEREAS, Plaintiff respectfully requests this honorable Court issue an EX PARTE ORDER FOR POSSESSION authorizing the Sheriff’s Department to take immediate action to remove, eject and prevent the Defendants from occupying the property and residence.

Respectfully,

Terance Healy

Emergency Praecipe for Immediate Eviction / Order of Possession( PDF )

Emergency Praecipe for Immediate Eviction/Order of Possession (Addendum)( PDF )

Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and Defendant’s Memorandum of Law ( PDF )

Plaintiff Responds to Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and Defendant’s Memorandum of Law
( PDF )

18 Pa.C.S. § 507: Use of force for the protection of property

(a) Use of force justifiable for protection of property.–The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary:
(1) to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or other trespass upon land or a trespass against or the unlawful carrying away of tangible movable property, if such land or movable property is, or is believed by the actor to be, in his possession or in the possession of another person for whose protection he acts; or
(2) to effect an entry or reentry upon land or to retake tangible movable property, if:
(i) the actor believes that he or the person by whose authority he acts or a person from whom he or such other person derives title was unlawfully dispossessed of such land or movable property and is entitled to possession; and
(ii) (A) the force is used immediately or on fresh pursuit after such dispossession; or
(B) the actor believes that the person against whom he uses force has no claim of right to the possession of the property and, in the case of land, the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be, are of such urgency that it would be an exceptional hardship to postpone the entry or reentry until a court order is obtained.

(b) Meaning of possession.–For the purpose of subsection (a) of this section:
(1) A person who has parted with the custody of property to another who refuses to restore it to him is no longer in possession, unless the property is movable and was and still is located on land in his possession.
(2) A person who has been dispossessed of land does not regain possession thereof merely by setting foot thereon.
(3) A person who has a license to use or occupy real property is deemed to be in possession thereof except against the licensor acting under claim of right.

(c) Limitations on justifiable use of force.–
(1) The use of force is justifiable under this section only if the actor first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from his interference with the property, unless the actor believes that:
(i) such request would be useless;
(ii) it would be dangerous to himself or another person to make the request; or
(iii) substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of the property which is sought to be protected before the request can effectively be made.
(2) The use of force to prevent or terminate a trespass is not justifiable under this section if the actor knows that the exclusion of the trespasser will expose him to substantial danger of serious bodily injury.
(3) The use of force to prevent an entry or reentry upon land or the recaption of movable property is not justifiable under this section, although the actor believes that such reentry or caption is unlawful, if:
(i) the reentry or recaption is made by or on behalf of a person who was actually dispossessed of the property; and
(ii) it is otherwise justifiable under subsection (a)(2).
(4) (i) The use of deadly force is justifiable under this section if:
(A) there has been an entry into the actor’s dwelling;
(B) the actor neither believes nor has reason to believe that the entry is lawful; and
(C) the actor neither believes nor has reason to believe that force less than deadly force would be adequate to terminate the entry.
(ii) If the conditions of justification provided in subparagraph (i) have not been met, the use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor believes that:
(A) the person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling otherwise than under a claim of right to its possession; or
(B) such force is necessary to prevent the commission of a felony in the dwelling.

(d) Use of confinement as protective force.–The justification afforded by this section extends to the use of confinement as protective force only if the actor takes all reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows that he can do so with safety to the property, unless the person confined has been arrested on a charge of crime.

(e) Use of device to protect property.–The justification afforded by this section extends to the use of a device for the purpose of protecting property only if:
(1) the device is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury;
(2) the use of the particular device to protect the property from entry or trespass is reasonable under the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be; and
(3) the device is one customarily used for such a purpose or reasonable care is taken to make known to probable intruders the fact that it is used.

(f) Use of force to pass wrongful obstructor.–The use of force to pass a person whom the actor believes to be intentionally or knowingly and unjustifiably obstructing the actor from going to a place to which he may lawfully go is justifiable, if:
(1) the actor believes that the person against whom he uses force has no claim of right to obstruct the actor;
(2) the actor is not being obstructed from entry or movement on land which he knows to be in the possession or custody of the person obstructing him, or in the possession or custody of another person by whose authority the obstructor acts, unless the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be, are of such urgency that it would not be reasonable to postpone the entry or movement on such land until a court order is obtained; and
(3) the force used is not greater than it would be justifiable if the person obstructing the actor were using force against him to prevent his passage.

( PDF )

1. Plaintiff respectfully requests the immediate action of this court to remove the defendant’s from his home and property and restore possession to the rightful, proper and legal owner of the home.

2. The evidence of fraud and deception in every document and activity relating to the conveyance of the property warrants immediate action.

3. There is reason to believe that the property and residence will be irreparably damaged or destroyed as: the fraudulent conveyance of the title is evident and the defendants cannot demonstrate or present any valid or correct title or deed or right to possession of the property and residence.

4. Defendants have been served with NOTICE, and the property posted, regarding trespassing on July 26, 2013.

5. Defendants have been served the Civil Complaint filed in this matter on October 3, 2013. This is confirmed by signed certified receipt from the US Post Office on October 4, 2013.

6. plaintiff has presented in the Civil Complaint the documents which demonstrate his rightful, lawful ownership of the property and residence.

WHEREAS, plaintiff respectfully requests this honorable Court issue an Ex Parte Order for Possession authorizing the Sheriff’s Department to take immediate action to remove, eject and prevent the Defendants from occupying the property and residence.

Respectfully

Terance Healy

Emergency Praecipe for Immediate Eviction / Order of Possession( PDF )

Emergency Praecipe for Immediate Eviction/Order of Possession (Addendum)( PDF )

Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and Defendant’s Memorandum of Law ( PDF )

Plaintiff Responds to Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and Defendant’s Memorandum of Law
( PDF )

… a multifaceted approach. Sign the petition to restore judicial integrity and the rights of the People.

The Petition can have no legal effect, BUT it will inform our government that we are aware of what happened and demand their full cooperation and support.

And if they are lawyers… choosing to stand in our way is repugnant to OUR CONSTITUTION… they best get out of the way! JUSTICE IS COMING.