A Terroristic Divorce

To preserve the integrity of the judicial process, the courts always should presume that a trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction.

But, they should permit a litigant to overcome this presumption by showing that the judge acted with actual malice, consisting of a knowing or reckless disregard of due process.

Specifically, if the court is to enjoy immunity, it must afford three things—notice, a chance to be heard, and a method of appeal.

In the matters of the Order of July 18, 2011, and the Order of September 23, 2011, Carolyn Tornetta Carluccio does not enjoy judicial immunity.

1. The Defendant had not been notified of the Plaintiff’s newly filed petitions delivered immediately before both proceedings.
2. The Defendant was not permitted to speak or present exhibits in support of his position on the matters.
3. Carolyn Carluccio has not permitted the Appeal to move forward to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
– Carolyn Carluccio was the ‘signing judge’ on August 15, 2011 when the Appeal was filed.
– Carolyn Carluccio has neglected to hear a Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed concurrently with the Appeal on August 15, 2011.
– Carolyn Carluccio has neglected to hear a Resubmitted Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed on September 19, 2011.
– Carolyn Carluccio has deliberately and intentionally written an opinion which contains irrelevant statements which misinform as to the nature of the Appeal and also applies an improper limitation on the period for filing an Appeal in the Matter.
– Carolyn Carluccio has maliciously, intentionally and fraudulently abused her power under color of law while acting to deny the Defendant his due process rights.
– Carolyn Carluccio has issued a void order without jurisdiction, based on a void order without jurisdiction, to enforce a void order where she lacked jurisdiction. Each subsequent void order sought to further harass and inflict intentional and deliberate harm upon the Defendant.

When unjust injuries are inflicted by improper judicial acts, the state or its insurers should be forced to bear the cost of the wrongful act, not the individual.

In acting with such deliberate action and purpose, Carolyn Carluccio has exposed the similar failures of the prior judges in this matter.

Of these three requirements, the opportunity to appeal should be the most crucial based on the policy that appeal, not a suit for damages, is the preferred method of challenging a judge’s improper actions. Deprivation of an opportunity to appeal effectively renders this policy meaningless and makes some other remedy necessary for proper redress. Moreover, the rightto appeal usually can correct due process violations. Even errors innotice and opportunity to be heard should not ofthemselves subject ajudge to suit as long as the opportunity to appeal is present. In effect, the appeal itself will afford a new opportunity for a proper hearing with proper notice.

The best solution is to give judicial immunity a firm root in due process guarantees. To achieve this result, the simplest approach is to create an irrebuttable presumption of immunity where the statecourt judge’s acts did not deliberately terminate a citizen’s rights without notice, hearing, and opportunity to appeal. Of these three requirements, the chance to appeal is the most important because it provides a means ofcuring defects inany other due process violation.
A judge thus remains unquestionably immune as long as he does not take actions that intentionally and plainly prevent further review.
The duty imposed on a state-court judge, then, is only to recognize that his own decisions may sometimes be in error and to ensure that orders affecting important constitutional rights can be reviewed in another court.